02/25/2002, Volume 007, Issue 23
Continued from http://www.clearwisdom.net/emh/articles/2002/4/25/21308.html
Why has there been so little oversight of such corporate activity? As Michael
Robinson puts it, for the first four years of the Net era, those with paranoid
visions of China's government were never quite able to square their suspicions
with the rapid expansion of the Chinese Internet. Although it was widely rumored
in Beijing that up to 30,000 state security employees were monitoring the
Internet in that city alone, the monitoring was also laughed at. Apparently the
bureaucrats liked monitoring pornography so much that they had a massive
backlog. State security was said to be lax, corrupt, full of holes. Chinese whiz
kids could still surf through the firewall and beyond. Associations could
flourish among the patrons of the cybercafes, using anonymous monikers. Many saw
the Internet as a populist river leading to the ocean of the global community.
Then, the Chinese government abruptly built a cyber-version of the Three Gorges
Dam.
In October 2000, the State Council ordered Internet Service Providers to hold
all Chinese user data--phone numbers, time, and surfing history--for at least 60
days. In November, commercial news sites were banned. In December, the National
People's Congress decreed all unauthorized online political activity illegal.
January 2001 saw the criminalization of Internet transfer of "state secret
information," such as reports of human rights violations. February brought
"Internet Police 110," software blocking "cults, sex, and violence" while
monitoring users' attempts to access such sites. By March, the surveillance
started to work; hundreds of e-mails on the controversy surrounding a
schoolhouse bombing in Jiangxi disappeared. Around the same time, Chinese
authorities announced near completion of a "black box" to collect all
information flowing across the Internet. In April, arrests of democracy
activists using the web and a nationwide crackdown on cybercafes reached
critical mass. Surviving cafes had to install internal monitoring software.
E-mail to Tibet now took three days to get through, if at all, and Falun Gong
e-mail was completely eradicated. By October 2001, when President George W. Bush
flew to Shanghai for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit, he was
entering an Internet police state. To deflect criticism, but perhaps also as a
demonstration of power, blocks on U.S. news websites were magically lifted by
Chinese authorities. The minute Bush went airborne, the blocks were back in
place. During Bush's current visit to China, any attempt to discuss loosening
Chinese Internet controls is likely to be brushed aside using the rhetoric of
our own struggle against terrorism (what, you're against surveillance?). But if
the Chinese take this tack, they are of course being dishonest about their own
motives.
There were urgent reasons for the Chinese Internet crackdown; fighting terrorism
wasn't one of them. Instead, look to the slow-motion crisis of a leadership
transition, the release of the Tiananmen papers, the emergence of a cyber-Falun
Gong, and a stirring--you could feel it on the street--for greater freedom of
expression, if not genuine democracy. Then again, there may be a more elaborate
game afoot. Chairman Mao knew the utility of briefly loosening controls to
create a dragnet. In effect, the current Chinese leadership promoted a "hundred
flowers" period of relative Internet freedom--again, not to capture terrorists,
but to expose anyone who disagreed with the legitimacy of their rule and to
attract massive Western investment. American technologies of surveillance,
encryption, firewalls, and viruses have now been transferred to Chinese
partners--and might even one day be turned against our own ludicrously open
Internet. We funded, built, and pushed into China what we thought was a Trojan
Horse, but we forgot to build the hatch.
Consider a Chinese user in search of an unblocked news site (weeklystandard.com,
for example). He won't expect to get through, and if he does, it will be cause
for alarm, for the site may be a tripwire--not for spam, but for state security.
Everything he does on the web might conceivably be used against him.
Pornography? Potentially, a two-year sentence. Political? Possible permanent
loss of career, family, and freedom. E-mail may be the most risky: Two years
ago, working from my office in a Chinese TV studio, I received an e-mail from a
U.S. friend (in a browser-based Hotmail account, no less, which in theory should
be difficult to monitor) with the words "China," "unrest," "labor," and "Xinjiang"
in queer half-tone brackets, as if the words had been picked out by a filter. I
now realize that it was a warning; any savvy Chinese user would have sensed it
instantly.
Before the crackdown one could escape and surf anonymously in a cybercafe¡¡or use
a proxy server--another computer that acts as an intermediary between surfers
and websites, helping to hide their web footprints and evade the filters. Not
surprisingly, the most common search words in China were not "Britney" and
"hooters," but "free" and "proxy." Fully 10 percent of Chinese users--about two
million people--used proxies regularly in an attempt to circumvent government
controls. In what Michael calls "the first sign of cleverness" by the
government, a proxy pollution campaign began last spring when the Chinese
authorities either developed or imported a system that sniffs the networks for
signs of proxies. A user, frantically typing in proxy addresses until he finds
one that isn't blocked, effectively provides the government with a tidy
blacklist. After a few of these tedious sessions, many of my Chinese friends
simply gave up climbing over the firewall. For a small fee, expat users could
turn to a web-based proxy browser, such as Anonymizer. But credit cards are
effectively blocked for Chinese citizens. Just for good measure, Anonymizer was
finally blocked as well.
IS CHINA'S Internet beyond redemption? Is it destined to be a tool of
surveillance and repression, managed by the Chinese government and serviced by
cynical Western partners? Maybe not. The Great Firewall might be vulnerable to a
few physicists at the University of Oregon. I spent a day watching Stephen Hsu
diagram the Chinese web and its weaknesses. Hsu and his company, SafeWeb, have
developed a proxy server system called Triangle Boy. The triangle refers to the
Chinese user, to a fleet of servers outside of the firewall, and to a mothership
which the servers report to, but the Chinese government cannot find. Already
tens of thousands of Chinese users have connected with it; five of the top
twenty Triangle Boy search sites are in the Chinese language. Every day, the
Chinese user receives an e-mail listing new addresses of Triangle Boy servers,
which allow the user to visit websites that they would otherwise be unable to
reach. Because the addresses of the servers change constantly, the system is
practically unbeatable. Any attack, especially on the mothership, requires
enormous resources.
But as surely as Triangle Boy works to liberate the surfing Chinese masses, you
can bet State Security is looking for a way to pounce on this latest proxy
rebellion. The simplest one will be to enlist American companies, still eager to
curry favor in Beijing, and get them to develop software allowing the Public
Security Bureau to sniff out and block proxies as quickly as they are created.
The only practical solution to this puzzle is for the Bush administration to
make Internet freedom in China a high priority. At the moment it is a laughably
small priority. The Voice of America, whose website has been a high-profile
target of Chinese blocking, last summer began funding Triangle Boy to the tune
of $10,000 per month. VOA officials undertook that small effort in frustration;
they attempt to send daily news via e-mail to some 800,000 addresses in China,
with no guarantee that they are getting through. Hsu estimates that supplying
one million Chinese users with Triangle Boy (approximately 600 million page
views a month) would require just $1 million annually. Budgeted at $300 million
a year, VOA has the means and is wisely looking at several other solutions as
well. But for VOA to justify an anti-blocking effort on a scale that will make a
difference, it will need to be seen as carrying out an important plank of
American foreign policy, not just acting on the margins as it is now.
And why not make this a higher profile U.S. policy? Cracking the Chinese
firewall is at least as technically interesting as strategic defense. Triangle
Boy is still theoretically vulnerable to spoof sites, authorization problems, or
a Code Red-style worm attacking the servers. That implies a need for a highly
technical layering operation, involving an endless and ever-changing supply of
low-key web-based proxies, mirror sites, and encrypted e-mail and instant
messenger services in Mandarin, Cantonese, and English, in sufficient volume to
overwhelm the Chinese firewall.
Creative engineers, unleashed to solve the problem of bringing Internet freedom
to China, might take any number of approaches. They might go through Hong Kong,
where illicit cables are said to run to Guangzhou. They might cut some deals
with a "loose" Chinese ISP, such as Jitong. They might use messages formatted as
images to defeat software that sniffs out characters. They might exploit the
fact that Chinese Internet addresses were originally configured in peculiar
blocks. Or the fact that the government's proxy-hunters come from only a few
locations. A shrewd native engineer could probably root out and defeat 99
percent of these government agents.
None of these measures will be cheap. Nor can we expect the U.S. government to
fully manage such a multi-pronged private-and-public defense of Internet
freedom. Even if they back the overall concept, administration officials will
inevitably want deniability about certain parts of such an operation. This means
the project will need to attract the support of foundations, human rights
groups, religious organizations--any group that cares about a free China.
But it will be worth it. Given the willingness of capitalists to work hand in
hand with the Chinese regime, the Internet may be the only force left that is
potentially anti-hierarchical. Think of it as a way to levy a web-based
democracy tax on the Chinese government. Think of it also as a way around the
university students and the intelligentsia, who are overrated as agents for
democratic change in China.
As the father of the Chinese Internet Michael Robinson notes, "In the Chinese
Internet's infancy, the first three sites that the government blocked were two
anti-government sites--and one Maoist site. What threatens them? . . . The
heartland." Ultimately, it won't be the intellectuals who are key to bringing
democracy to China. Irate overtaxed peasants with Internet-enabled cell phones
ten years from now are the real target market. And those whose dream is
democracy in China are operating with diminishing points of entry. The American
business presence in China is deeply, perhaps fatally, compromised as an agent
for liberalizing change. The Internet remains the strongest force for democracy
available to the Chinese people. But it remains a mere potentiality, yet another
American dream, unless we first grapple with the question: Who lost China's
Internet? Well, we did. But we can still repair the damage. We can, in Michael's
words, "lay down the communication network for revolution." If we don't, his
progeny may not forgive us.
Ethan Gutmann, a visiting fellow at the Project for the New American Century, is
completing a book, "Beijing Boot Camp."
http://www.weeklystandard.com/content/public/articles/000/000/000/923vznzw.asp
Category: Falun Dafa in the Media