May 2, 2003
(Clearwisdom.net) SARS has landed China's rulers with what is arguably the biggest challenge to their power in the country's 25-year reform era. But the crisis is not about the epidemic's medical demands or its economic fallout. Instead, it is political, the result of a long-brewing clash between an increasingly assertive population and an antiquated political system.
It's a problem that observers have known about for years. But most of the time discussion of it has been seen as churlish. Who can criticize 25 years of high economic growth, diminishing poverty and increasing liberties? Can such a country be suffering from misrule?
There was something to this view. The first quarter-century of communist rule was so disastrous -- the worst famine in recorded history, millions more killed in political campaigns and a totalitarian personality cult -- that any halfway sensible government looked great by comparison. Soon after the dictatorship of Chairman Mao ended in 1976, the party tried to win back popular support by withdrawing control over people's personal lives and allowing capitalist-style economic reforms. Over the years, this looser form
of control has succeeded in raising living standards.
Surprising to many -- the government included -- these successes haven't helped Beijing win deep-rooted legitimacy. With the government no longer micromanaging their daily lives, people now have time to travel, to think and, slowly, to demand more. With prosperity and better education, Chinese people have begun forming independent centers of power outside government control -- trade associations, religious organizations and clubs. It was the development of this sort of "civil society" that helped bring about the
downfall of communism in Eastern Europe. Now, these groups are demanding more -- more say in how society is run and a more competent government.
It would be incorrect to say that Beijing is paralyzed by these demands; it can still focus on some key issues and push through change -- consider China's admission into the World Trade Organization. But even on issues as neutral as economics, politics intrudes. This is because economic reforms have progressed to the point where a true market economy is only possible by adopting political reforms -- which, put simply, means an end to the Communist Party's monopoly over power. Only this step can pave the way to a
real market economy, which requires a fair judicial system, less corruption and transparent regulations. Despite the government's best efforts to separate the two, economics and politics make the same demands on the government.
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The SARS epidemic is linked to all this in two ways. First, a more transparent political system would have allowed a freer flow of information about the disease. One of the hallmarks of China's political system is that goals are set by the leadership, and underlings -- mindful of these "goals" ?- report statistics back to the top. This is the source of suspicion about China's economic growth statistics and the reason why provincial officials have been -- and probably still are -- covering up the true extent of the epidemic.
Second, Chinese people are now better able to recognize their leaders' limitations. The gratitude that came from the regime's early successes has eroded. The expectation is now that the government ought to control the outbreak. But the government's response -- secrecy above human lives -- has played disastrously, creating a confidence crisis.
Does this mean Beijing is finished; that, like the Soviets after Chernobyl, the current Chinese leadership is on its last legs? I wouldn't count on such a dramatic end. China's current political system has survived other shocks and will probably muddle through this one. Unlike the Soviet Union, China enjoys strong economic growth and no military threats. But this is still one of the most significant challenges to the government's credibility since the Cultural Revolution ended. That's because for many Chinese, it is proof that the current system doesn't work.
Only two other challenges come close to matching the epidemic's impact on confidence: the 1989 Tiananmen protests, put down with huge loss of life; and the [1999 to the present persecution] of the Falun Gong spiritual movement, when scores were killed and thousands sent to labor camps. In those two cases, the government could make the case -- however specious -- that it was dealing with unreasonable and unruly demonstrators. Many Chinese, conditioned to fear any sort of popular display of dissatisfaction, could agree that the students or disciples were reckless in confronting the government openly. By manipulating information, the government could shift the blame and claim that it acted reasonably.
But with SARS, the government has a harder time turning the tables. No one can blame the victims for dying. This time the government doesn't have a scapegoat. There are no "black hands" who allegedly stirred up Tiananmen protesters, no "evil cult." Instead it's obvious that the problem lies with an ossified political system, one out of its depth to handle the challenges of an increasingly demanding population. Skepticism is directed at Beijing: How can the country be run by a system that encourages widespread statistical fraud? One that puts innocent citizens at risk? Besides, while people are used to putting up with a lot in China -- endemic corruption, for example -- they have grown accustomed to some personal freedoms. Suddenly the government -- through its incompetence -- is back in people's personal lives, constraining their ability to travel, see friends and generally live their lives.
Authoritarian systems are often described as being all thumbs -- able to press down and crush but not to fine-tune. This is a perfect description of China's system. At some point it will be able to mobilize resources and crush SARS. But a modern society is made up of dozens of potential crises each year. Sophisticated political systems deal with them by turning over responsibilities to civil society: companies decide how many coal miners are needed, not a bureau in the capital; an open media fosters a public discussion of new religions; and independent medical organizations (albeit usually with government support and funding) take responsibility for monitoring health outbreaks.
Like a person carrying an ever-increasing burden, Beijing is weighed down by challenges. Its choice is clear: lighten the load or stumble.